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A Blow for Land-Use Planning?-
The Takings Issue Re-examined
I. INTRODUCTION
The takings clause of the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution'
continues to be the subject of spirited debate among courts, attorneys, legal
commentators, and the public. The debate focuses on when a regulation enacted as
a protection of a public interest exceeds the state's power to so act and results in a
"taking" of property that demands just compensation. 2 The decisions of the United
States Supreme Court both address and avoid this issue;3 the resulting body of law
provides no bright line test to determine what a taking is,# when a taking results,5 or
what appropriate remedy lies. 6
During the 1986 term, the Supreme Court heard three cases7 involving takings.
Each dispute arose from a governmental regulation enacted to promote a public good.
In one case the Court found the challenged regulation effected a taking;8 in one it did
not;9 and in the third, the Court did not reach the takings question on the facts before
it but held that a temporary regulatory taking equals a physical taking and requires
compensation.' t These decisions may potentially exercise a profound effect on
land-use planning practices and both local and national long-term development.
This Comment first identifies the tests and considerations utilized by the Court
in confronting takings questions. It then examines these three recent takings
1. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. This proposition was first stated by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922) ("if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking").
3. Joseph L. Sax's comments on takings jurisprudence remain appropriate today. He wrote that the "predominant
characteristic of this area of the law is a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results." Sax, Takings and the
Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 37 (1964). According to Sax, even the Supreme Court recognizes that it has failed to
formulate a set rule for the recognition of when a regulation ends and a taking begins.
4. The Supreme Court has established and used various tests to determine when a taking occurs: appropriation of
title, physical invasion, diminution of value, reduction of investment-backed expectations, noxious use, and no reasonable
remaining economic use. See infra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
5. The standard for finding a taking is that the "regulation must 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state
interest' sought to be achieved." Nollan v. California Coastal Comsm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147 n.3 (1987) (quoting Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). At times the takings standard has been confused with the due process standard,
which requires merely a rational basis for the state's enactment of the regulation. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S.
590 (1962). See also First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2390 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting), in which Justice Stevens was the only Justice who felt the due process clause should protect
property owners from "improperly motivated, unfairly conducted, or unnecessarily protracted governmental decision-
making." Id. at 2399. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor did not join Part IV of Justice Stevens' dissent, which discussed
the due process standard.
6. Remedies include striking down the regulation at issue, modifying it, and awarding monetary damages.
Determination of monetary damages is a complex issue. Various methods of evaluating property interests are used, but
no guidelines have been established. Difficult aspects of this problem are determining compensation when property value
has increased as a result of the regulation and deciding at what point to begin the valuation process-at the moment the
regulation goes into effect or at a later time when the regulation directly impinges the property owner's interest.
7. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232
(1987).
8. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. 3141.
9. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. 1232.
10. First English, 107 S. Ct. 2378.
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decisions, attempts to determine what prompted the Court's findings, and places each
decision within the Court's takings framework. Next, the individual decisions are
reconciled to the extent possible and examined to see if a concise and rational takings
analysis emerges. Finally, future implications of the cases upon the takings question
are discussed.
II. TAKINGS TESTS
The fifth amendment takings clause provides the starting point for analysis of the
takings issue. The Court's definition of a taking at any given moment in history
reflects the prevailing economic climate and social concerns at that time.'1 The
variation in application of the takings clause arises in part because the fifth
amendment does not define a taking. It merely provides that compensation be paid for
every taking of private property for public use. In determining the issue of a taking,
the Court measures the regulation against a substantial and legitimate state interest.12
The Court also considers the magnitude of the loss to the property owner and whether
any value or use remains in the property. State interests involving public health and
safety are more likely to be upheld than those that result merely in convenience for
the general public at the expense of one private landowner. If the Court determines
both that the regulation directly advances the asserted interest and no more reasonable
means to achieve the desired end exists, no taking will be recognized. The question
of when a regulation that advances a legitimate interest goes "too far,"1 3 however,
has yet to be answered.
While every confiscation of property-through physical occupation or appro-
priation or through regulation, whether it be temporary or permanent-does not
constitute a taking, the line between a valid police power regulation exercised for the
public benefit and a taking requiring compensation remains unclear. This is so despite
the various tests articulated by the Court to deal with the problem. None of the tests
standing alone is determinative of a taking. Rather each is a factor to use in
considering the controversy at issue. Time has proven the tests to be flexible enough
to allow the Court to reach what it feels are correct decisions in view of the particular
facts, circumstances, and parties before it.
The Court has frequently expressed its belief that each controversy must be
examined individually. 14 This ad hoe approach to individual disputes accounts for the
varying and sometimes seemingly inconsistent outcomes as the Court struggles to
reach fair decisions.
11. The Supreme Court generally left the interpretation of public use to the state courts. Bender, The Takings
Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BuFFALo L. REv. 735, 761 (1985). See West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 507 (1848) (condemnation by state court of bridge in furtherance of a public good without compensation upheld).
12. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
13. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
14. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) ("[This Court... has been unable
to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public
action be compensated by the government."); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926) (The
Court "has preferred to follow the method of a gradual approach to the general by a systematically guarded application
and extension of constitutional principles to particular cases as they arise, rather than by out of hand attempts to establish
general rules to which future cases must be fitted."); Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 ("[T]his is a question of
degree-and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions.").
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A. Direct Invasion or Physical Appropriation
The 1871 case of Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co. 15 provided the Court with its first
opportunity to examine the takings issue. 16 The Court held that direct damages
resulting from a permanent physical encroachment would be compensable.17 In a
later decision, the Court clarified its holding in Pumpelly and specifically held that
indirect damages would not be compensated. '8 This test continues to be used today.
It provided the basis for the Court's recognition of a compensable taking where a
cable television box was permanently installed on an apartment building. 19 The Court
also found a direct physical occupation resulted where a property owner was
prevented from using and enjoying the property by frequent aircraft overflights. 20
B. Matter of Degree Test
The Court articulated the seminal test for the determination of a taking in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.2' Justice Holmes proposed and applied the
"matter of degree" test: "The general rule at least is, that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.' '22
The Court did not rely on any single factor to determine when a regulation goes
"too far."23 It enumerated several considerations, any one of which could produce
a different outcome if the Court chose to emphasize it. These factors included
diminution of value, 24 nuisance, 25 destruction of all value, 26 reciprocity of
15. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871).
16. Private landowner brought suit to recover for damages to his property resulting from water overflow caused by
a dam that was erected under authority of a state statute. Id. at 167. Defendant argued the erection and maintenance of
the dam were state action; that any damage to the land was remote and consequential of the dam's existence; and that the
land had not been appropriated. Id. at 176-77.
The state constitution contained a provision nearly identical to the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution:
"the property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor." Id. at 177 (quoting Wis.
CoNsT. art. I, sec. 13).
17. Id. at 181.
18. Seven years after Pumpelly, the Court held that indirect injuries were not compensable. Transportation Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878). In Transportation Co., recovery for damages resulting from constretion of a tunnel under
a public street was sought; the damages consisted of rentals due to blockage of the access to plaintiff's dock and
warehouses during construction and physical damage to the warehouse structure. The Court distinguished Pumpelly and
found no damages owing because there was not a permanent "physical invasion of the real estate of the private own-
er .... " Id. at 642.
19. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
20. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
21. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
22. Id. at 415.
23. Id. The phrase "too far" is used often in takings analysis.
24. "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law.... [Slome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation." Id. at 412.
Justice Holmes also stated that the limitation is determined by the "extent of the diminution" in value after considering
all the facts and circumstances before the Court. Id.
25. Holmes referred to the law of nuisance in his discussion of the public interest and found that damage to
individual structures did not constitute a public nuisance. Id. at 413. Nuisance is one theory used by the Court to avoid
a compensable taking when the state, acting pursuant to its police power and out of a legitimate concern for public safety,
regulates the location and operation of a nuisance.
26. Holmes found that the statute in question made it "commercially impracticable to mine certain coal ... very
nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414.
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advantage, 27 public purpose, 28 and nature of the governmental regulation. 29 Reci-
procity of advantage, also known as the common burden of citizenship, refers to
reciprocal benefits and burdens enjoyed and shared by all members of society. 30 This
concept is used increasingly as an argument favoring public policy regulations
promoting expansive interpretations of public good and safety.
The Court continues to use these factors to guide its examination of the facts
before it.3t Reliance on one factor rather than another or the balancing of several
factors reflects the Court's concern for the particular interest before it, whether it be
public or private, and its efforts to keep governmental activity within constitutional
boundaries.
C. Frustration of Investment-Backed Expectations
The evolution of the tests applied by the Court continued in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City3 2 in which the Court again "balanced" several
factors before determining the takings issue. The factors considered were: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation, (2) the character of the government action, (3) the
necessity of the restriction to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose, and (4)
the possibility of an unduly harsh impact on the owner's use of his property. 33
Ultimately, Penn Central rested on economic concerns measured under both
diminution of value and frustration of investment-backed expectations approaches.
The Court focused on the value retained by the investor after the regulation's
application and determined the property interest remained valuable and useful. 34
D. Valid Public Interest and Noxious Use
The nature of the public interest advanced by a regulation is not an articulated
test, but it is frequently the basis for the Court's failure to find a taking. Public use,
like taking, is not easily defined. 35 However, when a regulation advances what the
27. Holmes rejected safety concerns on the grounds that in this situation the statute regulating the coal mining
companies' conduct did not secure "an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a justification of
various laws." Id. at 415. Under this theory, individuals affected by the regulation may suffer directly from the
regulation's provisions, but they still receive a benefit through both the regulation's positive effect on society as a whole
and the advantage of living in this particular society.
28. Public interest often provides a basis for finding a police power enactment valid. Holmes found the public
purpose of the statute to be "limited"; the "statute [does] not disclose a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive
a destruction of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights." Id. at 414.
29. The nature of the government regulation is closely related to public purpose. The government must not use its
power to benefit private interests at the expense of individual property owners. Justice Holmes felt this was clearly the
case in Pennsylvania Coal where the individual property owners (including city governments) failed to exercise foresight
in not acquiring the support estate when they purchased the surface estate. "[A] strong public desire to improve the public
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change." Id. at 416.
30. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
31. See infra note 37 for a list of cases in which the Court considered several factors in addressing the takings
question. See also Agins v. Tiburon,'447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104.
32. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
33. Id. at 127.
34. Id. at 136-37.
35. One commentator's view is that "the Supreme Court's failure to establish an interpretative floor for 'public
use' has emasculated the takings clause and resulted in a license for politically powerful private agents to take others'
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Court agrees is a valid public purpose, 36 and the property interest "taken" constitutes
a nuisance or noxious use, the Court is likely to find a valid exercise of the state's
police power and determine that no compensation is necessary. 37 Takings arguments
in the context of zoning cases often fail unless the challenged regulation is clearly
arbitrary and unreasonable, under the theory that the state may constitutionally
protect the public welfare by limiting certain activities that could be noxious in an
inappropriate setting.3 8
I. THE TAKINGS ISSUE AND THE 1986 TERM OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Current treatment of the takings issue both expands past precedent and limits it
as the Court struggles to propound correct decisions in each case it considers. While
the range of results may be appropriate to the individual litigants, the varying results
make it difficult to predict what the Court will find to be a taking39 and when that
taking will be compensable. Traditionally, a physical taking of private property for a
public use entitled the landowner to monetary compensation for damages. The
finding of a regulatory "taking," by contrast, resulted in invalidation of the
regulation. 4°
A. Recent Applications of Takings Analysis by the Supreme Court
Three cases heard and decided by the Supreme Court during the 1986 term
address aspects of the takings issue. These decisions add new dimension and
controversy to the issue.
private property at prices below those available by open and voluntary exchange on the market." Bender, supra note 11,
at 761 n.89.
36. See generally Bender, supra note 11.
37. The Court failed to find a taking and justified the restriction of property use on the noxious use theory in the
following cases: Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (rock quarry excavation came within city limits); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (infectious disease spread by red cedar trees would destroy economically important
apple orchards); Hadachek v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brick factory closed down when residential area built
up around it); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (brewery closed by regulation prohibiting manufacture of
intoxicating beverages). Each of these findings of a noxious use directly related to the importance placed on the restricted
activity or property by society's current economic and moral concerns.
38. This approach also generally holds that some value remains to the complaining property owner. The various
factors obviously are interrelated. Depending upon the facts, the Court could find a taking in a zoning case despite an
admitted and important public interest where the use of the property was destroyed totally and no value remained to the
landowner, or where the public interest was not advanced by the regulation at issue. The concept of public purpose has
expanded over the years, beginning with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), which was
grounded in nuisance and allowed the exclusion of industry from certain areas within the village, continuing through
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954), which recognized preservation of quality of life through the character and
aesthetics of an urban area, and culminating in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), which upheld a public
interest in defining family and incorporating that definition into the zoning code to determine the composition of groups
living in a neighborhood.
39. The positions of the Justices composing the Court during the 1986 term on these decisions illustrate this
dilemma and explain in part why the outcomes varied: (1) Justices Stevens and Blackmun found no taking in any of the
cases under consideration; (2) Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia found a taking in each instance; and
(3) Justices Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, and White voted differently in each case. The presence of Justice Kennedy on
the Court may affect future takings decisions; if he favors the Court's stand as reflected by the majority votes, his vote
would strengthen the pro-takings faction of the Court.
40. Morris, Supreme Court Land Use Decisions Uncertain in Defining a 'Taking,' Nat'l L. Rev., Sept. 7, 1987,
at 20. col. 2.
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1. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,41 the Court upheld a
challenged state statute enacted to promote an important public concern and found
that no taking resulted where the coal mining companies were unable to mine certain
coal in mineral estates they owned.
The Pennsylvania legislature enacted the Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act42 (Subsidence Act) in 1966 to protect the "public interest in safety,
land conservation, preservation of affected municipalities' tax bases, and land
development in the Commonwealth.' ,43 Under the Subsidence Act, a comprehensive
program was established to "prevent or minimize subsidence and to regulate its
consequences."- 44 Section 4 of the Subsidence Act prohibited subsurface mining
beneath three classifications of property-'"public buildings and noncommercial
buildings generally used by the public; dwellings used for human habitation; and
cemeteries." 45 Beneath these areas, the general rule required fifty percent of the coal
to be left intact to avoid subsidence of the surface. 46
The coal mining companies brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the
Subsidence Act, which they claimed took their property by destroying all value to
them. 47 Both the district court48 and the court of appeals 49 found sufficient public
purpose to sustain the statute as a valid police power measure.
In reaching its decision, the Court first looked at the purpose of the Subsidence
Act. It found that the state could exercise its police power to protect the public from
the dangerous conditions associated with surface subsidence in the designated
areas.50 Using this approach, the Court considered the nature of subsurface mining
and characterized its effects on the surface as the by-product of a nuisance.
Traditional takings analysis accords great discretion to the state when regulating a
noxious use that impairs public safety. The Court thus rejected the coal mining
companies' claim that the state exceeded its authority in enacting the statute. 5 1
The Court then considered the coal mining companies' claim that their interest
in the property affected by the regulation was destroyed. Specifically, they would be
unable to mine twenty-seven million tons of coal.5 2 The Court reasoned that the value
of the entire estate in property held by the coal companies would be minimally
affected by their inability to mine the coal in the proscribed areas. 53 The twenty-seven
million tons of coal could not be considered a separate estate from the remainder of
41. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, § 1406 (Purdon Supp. 1988).
43. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1236.
44. Id. at 1237.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1238.
47. Id. at 1238-39.
48. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 581 F. Supp. 511 (W.D. Pa. 1984).
49. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985).
50. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242-46.
51. Id. at 1245-46.
52. Id. at 1249.
53. Id.
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the subsurface coal.54 Consequently, the regulation did not deprive the property
owners of a reasonable return on their total property, nor did it deprive them of all use
of their property. The coal mining companies did not produce any evidence that they
would be unable to operate their businesses profitably under the application of the
statute.55
In reaching its decision, the Court had to re-examine its 1922 decision in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.56 Pennsylvania Coal dealt with a nearly identical
state statute (the Kohler Act) prohibiting subsurface mining beneath certain public
areas. It too was enacted for the public benefit and safety. However, Justice Holmes,
writing for the majority, dismissed the public safety concern and focused instead on
the contractual relationship between two private parties 57 and the effect of the statute
on the private obligation.
Without overruling Pennsylvania Coal, the Court in a five-to-four decision 58
ruled against the coal mining companies. The majority distinguished the 1966
Subsidence Act from the Kohler Act. Specifically, the Subsidence Act applied to all
property owners. Under the Kohler Act, surface owners who also owned the
contiguous support and mineral estates were not bound by the terms of the statute.
The Subsidence Act required compliance by all surface owners unless the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Environmental Resources consented. 59  This focus
re-emphasized the public safety and welfare concerns underlying the Subsidence Act.
The Court held that the regulation served a legitimate state interest of substantial
importance to the health, safety, and welfare of the state citizens. 6° The property
owners retained the ability to derive a substantial profit from their total investment
despite the regulation's prohibition of coal mining in certain locations, and the Court
accordingly found the Subsidence Act a valid exercise of the state's police power. 61
The dissenting Justices argued that the differences between the two Acts "verge
on the trivial." '62 They found the public purpose behind the Subsidence Act no more
compelling than that of the Kohler Act, which Justice Holmes struck down. 63 They
further found that the nuisance basis of the majority's opinion was ill-grounded
because the Act dealt with much more than nuisance control. 64 Finally, the dissent
rejected the majority's view of the estate in coal as an entirety and instead focused on
54. id. Interestingly, the Court completely ignored Pennsylvania's state law recognition of the subjacent support
as a separate estate in land.
55. Id. at 1250-51.
56. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
57. Id. at 415. "So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface
rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than they
bought." Id. at 416. In Pennsylvania Coal, both parties were private rather than governmental entities. The state
participated as an amicus of the defendant. In contrast, the state was the defendant in the Keystone litigation.
58. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and White voted to uphold the statute as a valid police power
measure. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia felt the statute effected a taking under the
reasoning of Pennsylvania Coal.
59. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242-43.
60. Id. at 1246.
61. Id. at 1248.
62. Id. at 1254 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 1255 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 1257 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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the particular coal affected by the regulation, much as Justice Holmes did in
Pennsylvania Coal.65 Under this approach, the value of the property was totally
destroyed, and, lacking a valid purpose, the statute worked a taking that required
compensation.
Under Keystone, therefore, the Court held that before a compensable taking will
be recognized the restricted property owner must prove the property affected by the
regulation is incapable of producing any profit and the regulation does not protect a
legitimate, general, and substantial "public interest in the health, the environment,
and the fiscal integrity of the area.' 66 The property considered will be a totality of
property interests and not just the effects of the regulation on one strand in the bundle
of property rights. In this respect, the majority adopted Justice Brandeis' definition
of property set forth in his dissenting opinion to Pennsylvania Coal.67 In light of the
presumption of legislative validity accorded state statutes by the Court, unless the
regulation were clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, the persons challenging the
regulation would have great difficulty overturning it.
The Keystone dissent claimed that the majority had in effect overruled
Pennsylvania Coal.68 The majority's distinction may seem nonexistent. However,
considering the focus upon private contract rights in Pennsylvania Coal, the status of
the parties to each lawsuit, and the provisions of the statutes themselves, the Keystone
majority's fine distinction holds. Pennsylvania Coal, after all, does stand for the
proposition that when a regulation goes "too far," a taking will be found. That
proposition remains valid today. Ultimate determinations depend upon its application
to the specific facts before the courts.
It is difficult to project the effect of this decision when it is applied to a situation
where the landowner's use and enjoyment of the property are totally destroyed and
the legislation that effected the destruction advances a legitimate state interest.
Underlying the Court's decision in Keystone, however, coupled with traditional
takings analysis, are the various factors the Court considers in determining a takings
question. A primary consideration is the use to which the property is put and the
nature of that use in relation to the surrounding neighborhood. A nuisance may be
regulated under the state's police power with less scrutiny than a non-nuisance.
Although the Court has "never applied the nuisance exception to allow complete
extinction of the value of a parcel of property," ' 69 it has sustained regulations that
significantly reduce the value of property. 70 In a situation where all use and value of
the property are destroyed by the challenged regulation, the nature of the regulation
would be scrutinized. When a regulation advances an interest under the state's safety
or defense powers, it will probably be upheld, while a regulation that does not have
such a strong basis will undoubtedly be struck down. In the past, the Court has
65. Id. at 1258-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1243.
67. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416-22 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1253-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 1257 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
70. See supra note 37 for a list of cases in which the Court found no taking effected by the regulation, but the
resulting economic loss to the individual property owners was great.
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strained to find some value and use remaining to the property owner. 7 1 However,
following the Court's decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles,72 which recognized that a temporary regulatory taking
requires compensation, it remains to be seen how courts will interpret and apply that
holding.
A major distinction between the Keystone majority and dissenting opinions is the
definition of property used by each. The majority adopted Brandeis' approach from
Pennsylvania Coal that considered the totality of the property interest and encom-
passed air, surface, and subsurface mineral and support estates into one estate. 73 The
dissent, in contrast, considered each unit of property within the owner's total
holding-the separate air, surface, and support estates, or a portion of any of them-
a distinct subject for takings analysis. By considering all of the coal owned by the
coal mining companies, the Court avoided the question of total destruction of
property value. The nuisance characteristic of the regulated use further strengthened
the Court's failure to find a taking in Keystone.
2. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 74 the
Court held that a property owner is entitled to compensation for a temporary
regulatory taking that deprives the owner of all use of the property for the period
between the enactment of the regulation and the determination that it effects a taking
under the fifth amendment. 75 A temporary taking that results in the property owner's
inability to use the property does not differ from a permanent physical taking. 76
The First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale (Church) owned a
twenty-one acre parcel of land located in the Angeles National Forest. Several
buildings, which were used as a camp for handicapped children, were located on the
property. 77 In 1978, the buildings were destroyed by a flood. Soon thereafter, the
County of Los Angeles designated the Mill Creek Canyon area of the Angeles
National Forest, which included the land upon which the camp was located, as a
flood protection area and enacted an interim ordinance prohibiting any repair or
construction of buildings within this area. The county determined the measure was
"required for the immediate preservation of the public health and safety.... 78
The Church sued soon after the designation and passage of the accompanying
ordinance. It sought a recovery under inverse condemnation because the ordinance
deprived it of all use of the property. 79 The California Superior Court rejected the
Church's claim on the ground that the proper remedy for the claim was a declaratory
71. See supra note 37.
72. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
73. This approach was also followed in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
74. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
75. Id. at 2381.
76. Id. at 2388.
77. Id. at 2381.
78. Id. at 2382 (citation omitted).
79. Id.
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judgment. Money damages would only be appropriate if the government continued
the regulation as enacted. The California Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme
Court of California denied review. 80
The United States Supreme Court did not address the issue of whether the
regulation in question did in fact deprive the Church of all use of and value in the
property regulated.81 It left that question for the state court to decide on remand. The
Court instead focused on the question of "whether the Just Compensation Clause
requires the government to pay for 'temporary' regulatory takings."82
The Court began by examining the text of the fifth amendment and considering
its rationale. It recognized that the government may appropriate property within
certain limits; the fifth amendment is "designed not to limit the governmental
interference with property rights per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event
of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking. "83
The Court turned its analysis to prior decisions in which it observed that damages
were recoverable for the period of time the property was affected by the regulation prior
to its abandonment. 84 It then held that "[ijnvalidation of the ordinance or its successor
ordinance after this period of time, though converting the taking into a 'temporary'
one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation
Clause.' '85
The three dissenting Justices found four "flaws" in the majority's analysis. 86
First, the Church's complaint did not allege an unconstitutional taking; it merely
sought damages and did not challenge the validity of the statute. 87 Second, the
majority misinterpreted precedent by confusing regulatory takings and physical
takings. 88 Third, the state may determine the appropriate procedure for awarding
damages and invalidating unconstitutional statutes; at the time of the decision,
California had not decided unilaterally that monetary damages may never be
awarded. 89 Fourth, the due process clause, and not the takings clause, is the "primary
constraint on the use of unfair and dilatory procedures in the land-use area."9
The dissenting Justices did not reject totally the suggestion that a regulation
could require compensation for a temporary deprivation of the owner's use of his
property. 9t They did, however, list more demanding qualifications for a deprivation
than did the majority:
80. Id. at 2382-83.
81. Id. at 2384-85.
82. Id. at 2385.
83. Id. at 2386 (emphasis in original).
84. Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372
(1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945). Compensation was required in these World War
II cases where the government temporarily appropriated the property for its own use.
85. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2388.
86. Id. at 2390. Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices Blackmun and O'Connor
as to two of its four sections.
87. Id. at 2390-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 57 Cal. App. 3d 613, 129 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (1976) (statute not subject to attack except in proceedings seeking damages through inverse condemnation).
88. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2393-96 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 2396-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2390, 2398-400 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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[T]he restriction on the use of the property would not only have to be a substantial one, but
it would have to remain in effect for a significant percentage of the property's useful life....
[A]n application of our test for regulatory takings would obviously require an inquiry into
the duration of the restriction, as well as its scope and severity.92
On remand, the California court must determine if there is a taking; if it finds a
taking, compensation must be paid. The state may still present convincing evidence
that the regulation is a reasonable, or perhaps the only, means of promoting public
health, safety, and welfare and thereby avoid the imposition of damages. 93
The First English Court recognized for the first time that a compensable taking
may result from a temporary deprivation of property rights through regulation. Under
this interpretation, money damages are available if a court determines a property
owner has been deprived of substantially all value and use of the property as a result
of a governmental regulation. Prior to First English, the invalidation of the statute
served as the sole remedy for such a "taking." It was felt that repeal of the offensive
regulation usually would "mitigate the overall effect of the regulation so substantially
that the slight diminution in value that the regulation caused while in effect [could
not] be classified as a taking of property." 94
The Court's recognition that temporary regulatory takings are compensable
appears to be a logical extension of traditional takings law. Yet the Court's holding
that a temporary regulatory taking cannot be cured by invalidation or modification of
the regulation effecting the taking presents potentially difficult problems for local
administrative agencies and courts. The principal problem is the chilling effect this
decision may have on certain land use regulations and policies adopted and followed
by local governments. Another problem is the valuation of the affected property
right-what method should be used and when should valuation begin in determining
what compensation is due under the fifth amendment.
As the dissent recognized, while in most cases invalidation of the regulation will
cure the minimal economic effects of the regulation on the property, situations could
arise in which value would be severely affected by the regulation. 95 The majority
provides no guidelines for measuring the lost value during the pendency of the
regulation. The dissent proposes consideration of three factors-"depth, width and
length." ' 96 Depth is the extent of the regulation's effect on the owner's use of the
property; width is the amount of property that falls within the regulation; and length
is the duration of the regulation. 97
The recognition that the just compensation clause requires compensation for
temporary regulatory takings is a new development in takings jurisprudence. Only in
extreme cases, however, does it open the door for extensive and expensive litigation
against local governments. In most cases, the standard for takings applied in the past
will be appropriate. As long as a rational basis exists for the regulation enacted by the
92. Id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 2384-85.
94. Id. at 2393 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2394 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
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state and the regulation substantially advances the state interest, it will stand. The
new approach allows compensation for regulations that clearly have no rational basis
and destroy the property owner's use of and value in the land. However, the potential
for chilling land-use decisions by local governments is very real. Depending upon
how courts apply the First English holding, and whether they require that the
regulation both unreasonably deprives the owner of the use of the property and
exceeds the state's authority under its police power, local planning boards may be
extremely reluctant to enact creative planning measures to deal with the community's
growth and development.
3. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,95 the Court determined that the
statute enacted by the government requiring the grant of a public easement across
privately owned property as a condition for the issuance of a building permit effected
a taking of private property within the meaning of the fifth amendment.
Mr. and Mrs. Nollan purchased a beachfront lot after leasing it for many years. 99
The sellers conditioned the sale of the property on the Nollans' destruction and
replacement of the existing bungalow, which was in a state of disrepair.'0 0 The
Nollans planned to demolish the structure and build a new home, which conformed
to existing homes in the neighborhood, on the same site.' 0 ' The California Coastal
Commission granted the necessary building permit, 0 2 but, pursuant to its interpre-
tation of the California Coastal Act, conditioned the permit upon the Nollans' grant
of a public easement across their beach property. 0 3
The Nollans protested the imposition of the restriction on the ground that the
condition was proper only insofar as the Commission proved an adverse impact by
their development on public access to the beach.' 0 4 The trial court agreed with the
Nollans.' 0 5 The Commission appealed the decision and the California Court of
98. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
99. Id. at 3143.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Permits are required for development under California Public Resources Code §§ 30106, 30212, and 30600.
103. Traditionally, public access across beaches is unlimited below the mean high tide line. The beach above the
mean high tide line remains private beach. The beach areas of the Nollans' property are separated from the rest of the lot
by an eight-foot high concrete seawall. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143. At some times of the year, the ocean extends over
the entire beach area to the seawall.
104. Id. at 3143. The Nollans originally sought an administrative mandamus in the Ventura County Superior Court
in protest of a ruling against their appeal to the California Coastal Commission. The trial court found for the Nollans and
remanded to the Commission for further consideration on the issue of the development's impact on the public's access to
the beach. The Commission reaffirmed its position. The Nollans filed a second administrative mandamus action with the
trial court, and it again found for the Nollans. On appeal by the Commission, the California Court of Appeals ruled in
its favor. From this ruling the Nollans appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court on the constitutional issue
of a fifth amendment taking.
105. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30-31 (1986).
California Public Resources Code § 30212 addresses the question of public access in development projects. Section
30212(b) sets forth a list of development-type activities not included in new development for purposes of permit
requirements. Subsection (5) defines exempted development activity as: "Any repair or maintenance activity ... unless
the commission determines that the activity will have an adverse impact on lateral public access along the beach"
(emphasis added).
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Appeals reversed. It broadly interpreted the provisions of the California Coastal Act
dealing with new construction and, in so doing, held that:
so long as a project contributed to the need for public access, even if the project standing
alone had not created the need for access, and even if there was only an indirect relationship
between the access exacted and the need to which the project contributed, imposition of an
access condition on a development permit was sufficiently related to burdens created by the
project to be constitutional.1 6
The Nollans appealed from the California Court of Appeals' decision directly to
the United States Supreme Court on the constitutional question of whether the
California Coastal Commission's regulation constituted a taking in violation of the
fifth amendment. 07 The Supreme Court found a taking.OS
In an opinion joined by four other Justices, 10 9 Justice Scalia stated the general
rule that a clear taking would occur if the state simply required the grant of a
permanent easement for public access across the Nollans' beachfront absent a clear
nexus between the regulatory requirement and the public need. 110 The focus then
turned to the concept of a regulatory taking. Justice Scalia found that a "'permanent
physical occupation' of the property, by the government itself or by others"' 11
resulted from the issuance of a development permit conditioned upon the grant of a
permanent easement to the public.
The Court reaffirmed its position originally articulated in Pennsylvania Coal that
a regulation enacted under the state police power must not go "too far." Looking first
at the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, the Court stated that "one
of the principal uses of the eminent domain power is to assure that the government
be able to require conveyance of . . . [property] interests, so long as it pays for
them. 1" 2 The Court then stated that "requiring uncompensated conveyance of the
easement outright would violate the Fourteenth Amendment . "... 13No con-
sideration was given to the California Constitution because the appeal to the United
States Supreme Court rested on federal constitutional grounds.114
In finding that the regulation effected a taking, the Court relied upon the theory
set forth in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 115 and Kaiser Aetna v.
United States," 6 which both recognized a taking based upon the slightest permanent
physical invasion theory. The Nollan Court drew upon these prior decisions for the
proposition that the right to exclude others is "one of the most essential sticks in the
106. Nollan, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 723, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31.
107. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
108. Id.
109. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor joined Justice Scalia to form the majority.
110. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145.
111. Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-33 n.9 (1982)).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 3146.
114. Nevertheless, the Court discussed the words in the California Constitution granting the public right of access
to the beach and found that a narrow reading of the appropriate section failed to support a state constitutional right of
access to the water across private property from the roadway. The California Coastal Commission wanted an easement
across the Nollans' private beach property between two public beaches. Id. at 3145.
115. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
116. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."'7 The Court regarded
the right to exclude the public from a permanent easement for a beach pathway as so
important that it could not be taken from the Nollans without compensation," r8 and
it found that the easement amounted to a permanent physical occupation of property
in the same way the cable television box permanently "occupied" Mrs. Loretto's
apartment building. The easement equaled a taking as found uniformly by the Court
on previous occasions "without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner."" 9
The Nollan Court also considered another line of cases in which the Court had
previously recognized that regulation of land use does not equal a taking if the
regulation "substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests." 20 Takings may also
be denied when an owner retains an "economically viable use" of the property. 121
However, these cases did not control in Nollan; Justice Scalia found that the
regulation "utterly fail[ed] to further the end" 1 22 it sought to achieve and, therefore,
could not withstand the constitutional challenge.
The Court upheld the use of exactions and restrictions for development with the
proviso that "unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as
the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but
an 'out-and-out plan of extortion.' "123 In the Nollans' circumstances, however, the
requisite relation between the restriction and the proposed use was lacking, and thus
the restriction worked a taking on the restricted property owner. 124
The Court rejected the argument of the California Coastal Commission that the
restriction was proper on the basis of a public constitutional right of access to the
beach. 12 The Commission failed to establish to the Court's satisfaction how the
public access to the beach was hampered by the building of a three bedroom dwelling
on the beachfront site of a previous bungalow. From the evidence presented, the
Court found the use of the site remained the same after the new development 26 and
the public need was not changed by the development.12 7 Therefore, absent any
compelling evidence presented by the Commission, the regulation worked a taking;
if the Commission wanted the easement for public access to the beach across private
property, it would have to proceed under eminent domain.
117. Id. at 176.
118. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
119. Id. at 3145 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)).
120. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 127 (1978).
121. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
122. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148.
123. Id. (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 3148-49.
126. Id. at 3149. Exactly what is meant by "new" development is unclear. The Commission acts on the
presumption that any development is development requiring a permit within the meaning of the California Coastal Act.
The language of the Act permits such a construction. Yet the state court cases reveal the unfairness that results from this
policy. The application of the standards to new large-scale projects is much more palatable than to an individual property
owner merely seeking to improve or even save property. See generally Tabor, The California Coastal Commission and
Regulatory Takings, 17 PAC. L.J. 863 (1986).
127, Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3149.
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The four dissenting Justices 28 argued that the easement requirement was a mere
restriction of the property's use' 29 and not a permanent physical invasion of the
Nollans' property. Furthermore, the dissenting Justices found that the regulation
advanced a valid government interest, and that the Court should not interfere with
either the state's determination of public welfare concerns or its enactment of
regulations furthering those concerns under its police power. ' 30 The dissent used an
equal protection standard-as long as the state could rationally have decided the
regulation might further the interest at issue and its action could not be proven
unreasonable and arbitrary, the regulation should be upheld as a valid exercise of the
state's police power. 31 The majority responded to this position in a footnote
elaborating the discussion of the standard applied: "We have required that the
regulation 'substantially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be achieved,
... not that 'the State "could rationally have decided" the measure adopted might
achieve the State's objective.' "132
The dissenting Justices also noted that the Nollans' property value was not
diminished to an unreasonable degree by the required easement. 133 In fact, the value
of the property increased directly as a result of the newly constructed dwelling. The
dissent found further support for the regulation in the reciprocity of advantage and the
investment-backed expectations theories.' 34 The Nollans received benefits of the
regulation as both private citizens and members of the public because they too enjoyed
the right to walk along the beach on either side of their property. 135 Because the public
access over the beach had been exercised by the public for years prior to the Nollans'
purchase of the property and the Nollans had prior notice of the permit condition for
new development, they could not claim that their investment-backed expectations had
been thwarted, nor that they had the expectation of a right to exclude the public. 136
B. Can Keystone, First English, and Nollan be Reconciled?
Of these three decisions, Keystone and Nollan are facially inconsistent. In Key-
stone, the Court found that the regulation advanced a legitimate public safety concern
and deferred to the state legislature absent a showing by the coal mining companies
that they would be unable to derive a reasonable return from their property. In contrast,
the Nollan Court did not find a reasonable relationship between the asserted state
interest and the regulation as it impacted on the Nollans' property, despite the long-
standing state goal in California to achieve public access to the beach along the entire
coastline. The Court held that the state must produce convincing evidence of the
validity of the regulation. First English accords with Keystone in that a legitimate
public safety purpose may save the challenged county ordinance on remand.
128. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
129. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3152-53, 3154 n.3 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 3150-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 3151-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 3147 n.3 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 3158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 3158-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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There may be an underlying consistency, however, to the decisions. In each suit,
a regulation enacted by the state pursuant to its police power to protect the public
health, safety, and welfare was challenged. Two of these regulations, the Subsidence
Act in Keystone and the California Coastal Act in Nollan, were state-wide
regulations. The regulation challenged in First English was a county ordinance.
The Keystone and Nollan statutes both addressed concerns that affected a large
portion of the state population. The purpose underlying the Subsidence Act in
Keystone was protection of state citizens from great potential danger and harm.
Although other concerns were articulated in the Subsidence Act, 137 its primary goal
was to protect the public in particular locations from the dangerous conditions
associated with subsurface coal mining.
In contrast, the provision of the California Coastal Act 138 at issue in Nollan did
not promote public safety. Rather, it furthered the state's interest in environmental
conservation and its desire to provide all state citizens with access to the ocean
shoreline for their enjoyment. The Court recognized that the Coastal Act promoted a
legitimate state concern. However, because this restriction resulted in a permanent
physical invasion that was not sufficiently related to a valid state interest, the exercise
of the eminent domain power by the state was the appropriate method by which it
could acquire the desired property interest. 139
The county ordinance at issue in First English was enacted as a measure to
protect the public from the dangerous conditions in a serious flood hazard area. In this
instance, the Court did not consider the nature of the regulation. It merely held that
a regulation may result in a temporary taking for which compensation must be paid
when a property owner is deprived of substantially all use of the property for a given
period of time. With this in mind, the Court did not disregard the public purpose of
the county's flood protection ordinance.
When considering all three of the challenged regulations, the strength of the
public purpose and its direct relationship to the terms of the regulation remain strong
considerations in favor of validity. In Keystone, the Court found that the public
purpose of avoiding a dangerous condition, which could affect a large portion of the
population, was a valid exercise of police power. Together with the avoidance of
danger to the public, the property owners retained valuable interests in the property
regulated and failed to show that they were unable to derive any profit from their
mining operations. 140 In Nollan, the Court found the public purpose of providing the
137. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1236 (1987) (land conservation,
preservation of affected municipalities' tax bases, and land development).
138. California Public Resources Code § 30001.5(c) sets forth one of the goals of the California Coastal
Commission: "Maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize public recreational opportunities in the
coastal zone consistent with sound resources conservation principles and constitutionally protected rights of private
property owners." Further, California Public Resources Code § 30211 states that "'[dlevelopment shall not interfere with
the public's right of access to the sea where acquired through use or legislative authorization .. " The goals of the
Coastal Commission are implemented through regulations enacted with the California Coastal Act, which include
requirements for coastal development permits for any development in the coastal zone. CAL. PuB. RaS. CODE § 30600
(West 1986).
139. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
140. Perhaps if proof had been offered that mining could not be pursued profitably, as it had been convincingly
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population with access to the beach was not one compelling enforcement of the
statute under the state's police power. In First English, the Court left the issue of the
validity of the interim ordinance and its asserted public purpose for the lower court's
determination on remand.
In actuality, these decisions are not inconsistent. The Court's concern with a
valid purpose regulated through appropriate means is clear throughout each opinion.
Although all three were close decisions, the majority in each looks to the underlying
basis of the regulation and then considers the effect of the regulation. The First
English decision carries the process one step further and equates a temporary
regulatory taking with a physical taking where the owner is deprived of substantially
all use of the property, a step not as radical as it appears in light of the dissenting
opinion. 141
C. A New Definition or Direction for Takings Analysis?
These decisions do not appear to present a new direction for takings analysis; nor
do they result in a new test for determining when a taking is effected. They draw upon
past tests and concerns enunciated by the Court. The Court focused strongly on the
economic potential retained by the property owners, evidencing a concern that the
property owner not be deprived totally of all use and value in the property. The Court
also focused on the relationship between the purpose underlying the regulation and
the terms of the regulation to effect that purpose. Nollan adds another narrow
application to the physical invasion test. While the Loretto Court found a taking from
the placement of a small physical object on an apartment building, the Nollan Court
held that an easement for the passage of the public across private property was a
"permanent physical occupation," 42 which effected a taking and required compen-
sation to the property owner. More importantly, the Court re-emphasized the
requirement that there be a rational relationship between a legitimate state interest and
the restriction imposed by the regulation.
The new dimension added by First English is that a temporary regulatory taking
is now possible. This holding expands previous decisions that recognized compens-
able takings resulting from temporary physical takings.
IV. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISIONS
A. Concerns
Legal commentators soundly criticize the "crazy-quilt pattern"' 43 resulting
from the Court's decisions on the takings issue. 144 They decry the uncertainty found
argued in Pennsylvania Coal, the statute would have been held to effect a taking for which compensation must be paid,
or under which the statute must be overturned.
141. The Court held generally that a temporary regulatory taking will be compensated; it did not hold that this
regulation was invalid. The regulation itself must be examined considering the totality of takings factors to determine if
it effects a taking.
142. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 432-33
(1982)).
143. Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County. In Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme Court Expropriation Law,
1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63, 63.
144. See generally Bender, supra note I I; Costanis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the
Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (1983); Epstein. The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain:
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in the Court's takings decisions, which makes it impossible to guess when a taking
will be found and when it will not. 145 These concerns remain after Keystone, First
English, and Nollan. The Court adhered to its earlier position that the takings area
defies a set formula and once more did not suggest any provisions that make the
determination of a taking more certain or the valuation of the property loss more
readily calculable.
Government agencies have other concerns resulting directly from these deci-
sions-fears that they will be inundated with expensive time-consuming litigation
146
and that creative land-use planning necessary to deal with rapid population growth
and development will be chilled. Whether or not these decisions will exercise a
chilling effect on land-use planning awaits the courts' applications of the holdings to
specific facts. Both Nollan and First English, however, present courts with Supreme
Court decisions that could substantially curtail planning practices at every level of
government.' 47 Of these decisions, the First English Court's recognition of a
compensable temporary regulatory taking could have the most devastating conse-
quence on the planning process. If courts do find regulations that deprive an owner
of the property's use for a specified period of time effect a compensable taking, even
when the regulation advances a legitimate public interest, planners will be hesitant to
propose growth moratoria or to zone areas for the most highly restricted use at the
exclusion of other uses.
Nollan raises questions about the appropriateness of exactions and dedication
requirements in connection with development. Exactions and dedications have
become a means whereby communities are able to absorb development because
developers assist in the financing of infrastructure improvements and other commu-
nity requirements, which usually have been necessitated by the development. 48
Justice Scalia admitted in Nollan that had he been able to find a direct connection
between the Coastal Commission's permit requirement and the asserted state interest
in maintaining a barrier-free access to the ocean, he would have allowed the
A Constitutional Liberty Under Attack, 4 PAcE L. Rev. 231 (1984); Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use
Regulations, 15 GA. L. REv. 559 (1981); Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HAsIwGS Cosr.
L.Q. 491 (1981); Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11 ENvrL. L. 1 (1980);
Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sallet, Regulatory "Takings" and Just Compensation: The Supreme Court's Search for a
Solution Continues, 18 URt. LAw. 635 (1986); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964); Stoebuck,
A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REv. 553 (1972); Wright, Exclusionary Land Use Controls & the
Taking Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545 (1981).
145. Joseph Sax's comments are representative of the criticism: "[Tihe Court has settled upon no satisfactory
rationale for the eases and operates somewhat haphazardly, using any or all of the available, often conflicting theories
without developing any clear approach to the constitutional problem." Sax, supra note 3, at 46.
146. See generally Morris, supra note 40; Callies, Takings Clause-Take Three, 73 A.B.A. J. 48 (Nov. 1, 1987).
147. See generally Falik & Shimko, The "'Takings" Nexus-The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in
Land-Use Planning: A View from California, 39 HASnTNos L.J. 359 (1988); Peterson, Land Use Regulatory "Takings"
Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGs L.J. 335 (1988); Stroud, Legal Considerations of
Development Impact Fees, 54 J. Am. PLAN. A. 29 (1988).
148. The rational nexus test is the mainstream method for analyzing the appropriateness of development impact fees.
"[Tlhe rational nexus test is a cost accounting approach that requires local governments to vigorously analyze the impact
of new development on public facilities, and then to balance the government's revenue needs against the cost concerns
of the development industry." Stroud, supra note 147, at 30. Prior to Nollan, California utilized a rational basis test under
which any state interest would be enforced through regulations that were loosely constructed and did not directly advance
the purported interest.
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regulation to stand. Although the permit requirement did further an important and
valid state interest, requiring the easement dedication of an individual private
property owner who would continue to use the property in the same manner as it had
been used previously, with no increased population or structural density on the site,
seems unreasonable.
Despite the fears expressed by commentators, in actuality these decisions only
tell public planning agencies to watch their step and to avoid overreaching, overbroad
practices in their quest to regulate local policies. Planners must specifically tailor both
the statutory requirements to further community needs and the means necessary to
achieve the desired goal. The Court fears that overreaching practices seek "avoidance
of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police power objective." 149
Given the Court's deference to regulations that bear a rational relationship to an
asserted legitimate state purpose,' 50 the decisions in Keystone, First English, and
Nollan reinforce the Court's unwillingness to become a super zoning appeal board.
Regulations phrased in terms of legitimate public purposes, which provide specific
means to advance that purpose directly, will withstand any court's scrutiny. In cases
where the restricted property owner presents convincing evidence that a restriction is
arbitrary and unreasonable, the burden will shift to the state to prove the existence of
a legitimate interest and the appropriateness of the restriction to further it.
Specifically, in Nollan the Court said that the Coastal Commission's justification
for its requirement was simply its belief about what would benefit the public. The
Court concluded that the Commission was free to implement its policy, but to do so
it must use eminent domain and compensation because no rational relationship
existed between the asserted state purpose and the restriction imposed. Succinctly,
"if it wants an easement across the Nollans' property, it must pay for it." 151
The dissenting Justices in First English expressed a concern for the policy
implications of that decision. "Cautious local officials and land-use planners may
avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damage
action."l 5 2 The Justices further feared that regulation reflecting valid public health
and safety concerns would not be enacted when needed because of the unpredictable
nature of takings analysis. This concern may be quieted by the Court's concern for
a legitimate public purpose and its deference to the local legislative body when such
a purpose is shown. Again, ensuring that the regulation effectuates public health,
safety, and welfare concerns and that those concerns in fact exist will preclude
judgments overturning local regulations.
B. Realities
Although the fears of Supreme Court Justices, judges, and commentators that
these decisions will have an adverse influence on land-use planning in the future
149. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3150 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. See Justice Scalia's discussion of the differences between due process and equal protection claims in Nollan,
107 S. Ct. at 3147 n.3. See also id. at 3151-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 3150.
152. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 2399 (1987) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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merit consideration, the reality of the practices of planners and governmental
agencies may limit the far-reaching effect of the decisions. Furthermore, in the future
each decision may be interpreted narrowly, limited by its specific facts, and thus have
a limited effect as actually applied by the courts.
Under First English, the regulation must first fail to further a legitimate
substantial state interest and it must then deprive the owner of substantially all use and
value in the property before a temporary regulatory taking will be recognized. Under
Nollan, a close relationship must exist between the restriction, the proposed use, and
the state goal. While Nollan could be applied to large-scale developments, it is more
likely that its impact will be felt only in cases dealing with individual private property
owners challenging a regulation that advances a weak state interest. In the case of
corporate development of large tracts of land, the needs perceived by the state and
articulated in the regulations will usually be more easily justifiable as new
development imposes new demands on the environment and existing municipal
infrastructure. Redevelopment of large tracts presents the same concerns. Regula-
tions conditioning any large-scale development may easily be drafted in terms of
legitimate public concerns about the effect of the development on the character of the
existing neighborhood and available municipal services.
Similarly, under the Keystone analysis, a valid public purpose must be found by
the legislature and the statute enacted must substantially further that purpose. Given
the presumption of legislative validity afforded state governments by the Supreme
Court, future cases brought under the Keystone rationale will be difficult for the
parties challenging the regulation to sustain.
The net effect of the decisions is to protect the individual private property
owner's rights through a strengthening of the fifth amendment takings clause.
California state court decisions preceding Nollan, which involved the Coastal
Commission and its permit requirements, reveal the power of the state agency and the
relative helplessness of the individual homeowner. 53 The holdings of all three
decisions are a fair application of the fifth amendment takings clause and show the
sensitivity the Court must demonstrate toward public concerns and private interests in
effective takings analysis.
V. CONCLUSION
Takings jurisprudence is an area of changing emphasis and uncertainty reflecting
elements of current social, political, and economic concerns. 154 The Court recognizes
the difficulty surrounding the takings question. This is one reason it has addressed the
153. See Grupe v. California Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985) (condition
requiring public easement across two-thirds of beachfront property upheld as prerequisite for building permit to construct
single family home); Remmenga v. California Coastal Comm'n, 163 Cal. App. 3d 623, 209 Cal. Rptr. 628, appeal
dismissed, 474 U.S. 915 (1985) (condition requiring public easement across beachfront upheld as prerequisite for building
seawall to protect property from ocean damage). See generally Tabor, The California Coastal Commission andRegulatory
Takings, 17 PAc. L.J. 863 (1986); Comment, Public Access and the California Coastal Commission: A Question of
Overreaching, 21 SAwrA CLARA L. REv. 395 (1981).
154. One commentator suggested that there should be a touchstone for takings that does not vary with political and
economic policy. See Bender, supra note 11.
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issue sporadically, avoided it when possible, left its resolution and definition to the
state courts, and articulated varying tests and concerns for its definition. The
decisions in Keystone, First English, and Nollan reflect the Court's concern that the
police power not be used in an inappropriate manner, that valid public purposes form
the basis for exercises of eminent domain and police power, and that government act
carefully and thoughtfully in enacting regulations that deprive property owners of the
use and value of their property.
The Supreme Court did not produce a new and precise definition of a taking
hoped for by commentators and practitioners. But neither are these decisions radical
departures from past holdings. Each advances takings theory using traditional takings
analysis, and each is consonant with the circumstances. Nollan reasserts the required
nexus between the state interest and the terms of the regulation designed to achieve
that interest. Nollan further emphasizes the differences between equal protection and
due process analysis and holds that takings issues must be analyzed under due process
concerns; regulations challenged as a taking require more than a rational basis to be
valid. Although Keystone appears to contradict Pennsylvania Coal, it actually
continues the evolution of takings analysis that began in Pennsylvania Coal and
culminated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.
First English also culminates one aspect of takings analysis that eluded the Court
for years-whether a remedy other than invalidation of the regulation is available to
recompense the affected property owner when a temporary regulatory taking is found.
The recognition of a compensable temporary regulatory taking is potentially the most
far-reaching of the decisions and opens a new area for takings challenges. However,
its impact awaits courts' clarification of the holding as to what is necessary before a
temporary regulatory taking will be found. The Court itself limited the holding to the
facts before it and did not "deal with the quite different questions that would arise in
the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in zoning
ordinances, variances, and the like. .... *,,55 Even more than long-range planning
guidelines, these areas could cause devastating financial problems to communities.
Perhaps one day the Court will discuss the takings question thoroughly and
consider the roles of each of the many factors it has established for guiding takings
analysis, set parameters for valuation of appropriated property interests, and state
clearly the standard under which takings challenges will be reviewed. Until that time,
however, the takings issue will continue to be addressed in light of the particular
scenario before the courts, and ultimate holdings will be far from predictable.
Sylvia Lynn Gillis*
155. First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389.
* The author wishes to acknowledge and thank Professors Kenneth Pearlman and Earl Finbar Murphy of The
Ohio State University College of Law for their comments and assistance during the preparation of this Comment.
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